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THE CHAPTER 11 FINANCIAL ADVISORS
Stephen J. Lubben*
It has been observed that large chapter 11 cases have become increasingly
“professionalized.”1 In particular, while debtor’s counsel might once have
handled the bulk of the reorganization, the debtor now routinely retains
specialized professionals to address specific aspects of its case.2
Among the most controversial of these non-legal professionals have been
the financial advisors, as they often earn transaction fees based on either the
sale or reorganization of the debtor.3 Financial advisors are typically
compensated with a combination of flat monthly fees and outcome-contingent
transactional fees, and thus fit uneasily into the chapter 11 system, which is
largely dominated by lawyers and former lawyers acting as judges, both of
whom are most accustomed to billing hourly rates plus expenses.4 And then, of
course, the most vocal commentators on professional fees are also lawyers, in
the form of law professors.5

* Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This paper is based on my
dissertation prepared for the Ph.D. program at the University of Groningen, Department of Law and
Economics, which is in turn based in part on data gathered by the author as part of the ABI Chapter 11
Professional Fee Study, funded by a grant from the American Bankruptcy Institute, the ABI Endowment Fund,
and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. I am grateful for the ABI and NCBJ’s assistance with this
project. All conclusions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ABI, the NCBJ, or their
members.
1 See Jo Ann Brighton et al., For Better or Worse: Chapter 11 in the Post-BAPCPA Downturn, 7
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 555, 578–79 (2009).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 125 B.R. 837 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (disapproving
interim fee applications submitted by Bear Sterns Co., Inc., the Committee’s financial advisor); Linda Sandler,
Lehman Pays Its Bankruptcy Advisers $262.6 Million for 9 Months, BLOOMBERG, July 9, 2009, 12:01 AM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apzbxu6eOxik (describing the lucrative fees paid
to the financial advisors of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.).
4 Michael L. Cook & Stephen J. Lubben, Retention, Payment, Ethical and Other Obstacles for NonLegal Professionals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, in ETHICS IN CONTEXT, at 175, 181–82 (PLI N.Y. Practice
Skills, Course Handbook Ser. No. 66, 1999) (“Courts throughout the country differ in their views of non-legal
professionals. Retention arrangements that are routinely approved in Manhattan and Wilmington may be met
with skepticism, if not outright hostility, in Los Angeles, Denver, or Tampa.”).
5 See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 120 (2011) (“Financial advisors often do a substantial
portion of their work prior to the filing of the petition. In some instances, they seek payment for that work after
the filing of the petition. That practice is improper, both because the estate has no right or obligation to pay
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It may be that attorneys are poor observers of other professionals’ fee
structures and general business practices. But given the increasing importance
of financial advisors in chapter 11 and other reorganization schemes, the need
for some evidence of how these advisors influence chapter 11 costs is
increasing as well.
This short Article begins the discussion by considering a sample of
financial advisors involved in chapter 11 cases filed in 2004. Part I of the
Article describes the dataset and the types of financial advisors that routinely
appear in chapter 11 cases. Part II provides some basic descriptive statistics
regarding these financial advisors, and it also provides a brief discussion of the
types of professionals that routinely appear in chapter 11 cases beyond
bankruptcy counsel. Among other things, Part II shows that financial advisors,
although receiving much attention and criticism, actually cost slightly less, on
average, than the debtor’s bankruptcy attorneys.
Part III then models the costs of financial advisors. In this Part, I find that
cost increases if both the debtor and the committee retain financial advisors.
Costs also increase with the contentiousness of the case, which I suggest
reflects a tendency to focus on the large, lump-sum fees earned by financial
advisors in such cases.
Part IV of the Article then turns to look at the specific issue of debtorretained financial advisors, as they make up the bulk of financial advisor cost
in chapter 11.6 Here, the most interesting finding is that the size of the debtor
matters, whereas it does not seem to matter when financial advisors are
considered in the aggregate. This again suggests the importance of a finer
understanding of the workings of financial advisors and what they actually
“do.”
Part V of the Article wraps up by considering the legal and policy
implications of these findings. In particular, I note how poorly the Bankruptcy
Code, as drafted in 1978, is suited to the types of compensation structures that
financial advisors and turnaround consultants typically receive. Looking
specifically at § 328(a), I argue that it may be time to revamp large parts of the
Code to reflect the reality of modern chapter 11 practice.

pre-petition unsecured debt and because the court can award compensation only to ‘a professional employed
under [§] 327.’” (footnote omitted)).
6 See infra Table 3.
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I. THE DATASET
I begin with the dataset I collected for the American Bankruptcy Institute’s
(ABI) Chapter 11 Fee Study.7 This dataset includes cases that were originally
filed in 2004, and the data within each case comes from publicly available
court filings that were primarily collected from Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER).8
The dataset is non-random, comprising of nearly all 2004 bankruptcy cases
listed in the “Major Bankruptcies” database on BankruptcyData.com.9
Excluded from the dataset are all cases initially filed under chapter 7 and never
converted to chapter 11, along with all cases filed under former § 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code.10
Two broad types of professional fee data were collected: debtor
professional expenses and committee professional expenses. In particular,
under § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code and under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2016, all professionals retained by either the debtor or an official
committee (most often a creditors’ committee) must file fee applications with
the court before they can be paid from estate funds.11 A similar rule applies to
professionals retained by examiners or trustees,12 and the datasets also include
7 The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Chapter 11 Fee Study is available online. Stephen J. Lubben,
ABI Chapter 11 Fee Study (Seton Hall Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1020477, 2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1020477. The study is extensively discussed in Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization &
Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Lubben, Corporate Reorganization].
8 PACER is available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/. For more on conducting empirical research of
bankruptcy cases through PACER, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123, 2148 (2002).
9 New Generation Research, Bankruptcy Search, BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, www.bankruptcydata.com/
findabrtop.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 146. Section 304 was repealed in 2005 as part of the
enactment of the new chapter 15. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713,
718–20 (2005). Both § 304 and the new chapter 15 deal with the recognition of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States. See generally id.
11 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2006) (permitting a bankruptcy court to compensate professionals who have
previously been retained by the estate); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a) (“An entity seeking interim or final
compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary expenses, from the estate shall file an application
setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2)
the amounts requested.”).
12 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (permitting fees for a professional person employed by a trustee subject to
§ 327). The Code does not expressly provide for an examiner to retain professionals, but courts have typically
assumed they have such powers. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1106.05[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011); see also In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 147–48 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In
re Southmark Corp., 113 B.R. 280, 281–82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
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that information. Bankruptcy-related professional fees incurred in the days just
before the bankruptcy filing are reported on the debtor’s statement of financial
affairs and thus are also included in the dataset. Professional fees incurred by
creditors who have a contractual right to charge such fees to the debtor—such
as secured lenders—are not included in the dataset, inasmuch as these sorts of
reimbursement obligations are not subject to § 330 and are therefore not
subject to express disclosure.13
The present study modifies the original ABI dataset in several key respects.
For example, in the original study, each case was followed for two years or
until it ceased to be in chapter 11 because either a plan was confirmed, the case
was converted to chapter 7, or the case was dismissed.14 I took this approach
with the data due to the required timeline for producing the final report for the
ABI Chapter 11 Fee Study.
To examine whether this censoring had any effect on the data, I revisited
the cases that were still pending in chapter 11 when the original study was
completed and re-coded them to include their final resolution and all
professional expenses incurred through that resolution.15
Additionally, I revamped my approach to measuring the debtor’s assets and
liabilities in the dataset, which previously had been taken only from the
debtor’s schedules. First, when available, asset and liability information was
obtained from Bloomberg Professional.16 Typically, this information came
from the company’s most recent pre-bankruptcy SEC filings, but Bloomberg
also provides financial information for certain larger privately held companies
in the sample (e.g., Tower Records). Then, only if financial information on the
debtor was unavailable on Bloomberg, assets and liability information was
taken from the debtor’s schedules. This change was made for a variety of
reasons, most notably to reduce the risk that debtor size—a key factor in the
present study—would be misspecified for the corporate groups in the dataset,
since schedules are often filed on a corporation-by-corporation basis, whereas
chapter 11 costs are typically incurred by the group as a whole.
13 These professionals are not retained by the estate and thus not subject to the terms of § 330(a)(1).
Instead, their claim for compensation is folded into the creditor’s overall claim again the estate. See generally
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007) (allowing creditor’s
claim for attorney’s fees under an indemnification agreement).
14 Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 7, at 79. The study “capture[d] professional fees
incurred during the study period, even if approved or requested outside of the stud[y] period.” Id. at 85–86.
15 See id. at 87–88 (discussing the censoring issue).
16 73.2% of the cases in the dataset are coded with Bloomberg information.
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With these changes, the dataset is now comprised of ninety-seven chapter
11 cases filed in 2004.
***
Bankruptcy financial advisors come in two broad types.17 First, there are
investment banker-type advisors, who either help market (i.e., find a buyer for)
the debtor or advise the debtor on business changes going forward.18 In
addition to a debtor, a committee can also retain an investment banker-type
advisor to provide advice about the debtor’s business prospects and the
financial terms of the proposed plan. Second, there are accounting firms that
act as financial advisors. They typically provide similar business advice to the
debtor or the committee that retains them, but they are less likely to engage in
direct efforts to sell the debtor.19 In addition, both types of financial advisors
typically present valuation evidence at a hearing to consider a reorganization
plan for the debtor.20
Somewhat related to financial advisors are turnaround consultants.21 These
are professionals retained by the debtor. Like financial advisors, they provide
business advice to the debtor—indeed, some of the same firms act as financial

17

See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5, at 90–93.
Until 2005, these firms were typically not large, well-known American investment banks, as the
Bankruptcy Code expressly precluded retention of an investment banker that had been an underwriter for the
debtor’s securities. See Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann, Selling Out Corporate Reform: Eliminating The
“Disinterested Person” Requirement for Investment Bankers Advising Chapter 11 Debtors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 731, 736–47 (2006) (discussing the history of investment banker retention); Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron
and the New Disinterestedness—The Foxes are Guarding the Henhouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 521
(2005) (discussing the 2005 change to the Code). In addition, it should be noted that financial advisors retained
in chapter 11 cases only rarely underwrite securities offerings, so some would argue they are not actually
“investment bankers.”
19 See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and
Dutch Business Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 76 (2011) (describing the wide variety of professionals
retained by debtors, including accounting firms who act as financial advisors); see also U.S. Trustee v. Price
Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 139 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he debtors filed applications to employ Price Waterhouse as
their accountant and financial advisor.”).
20 For example, in all chapter 11 cases, the debtor is required to prove that creditors are receiving at least
as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (2006). This
frequently involves hiring experts to create a liquidation analysis and present it at the hearing. See id. See
generally Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419 (1996) (outlining
techniques frequently used by valuation experts in bankruptcy cases).
21 The only other study of financial advisors in chapter 11 includes turnaround consultants among its
definition of financial advisors. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 142
(2008).
18
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advisors when retained by a committee.22 These turnaround consultants
typically become more involved in the direct management of the debtor, often
taking positions within the debtor’s senior management.23 In some instances,
the retention of these firms is mandated by a senior lender or the lead lender
for the banks in the debtor’s secured credit facility.24 Appointment of a
turnaround firm and a member of that firm as “chief restructuring officer” is
sometimes the price for obtaining additional financing during a chapter 11
case.25 In other cases, a turnaround firm, despite its hopeful title, manages a
remnant debtor following its asset sale, liquidating unsold assets and working
toward a plan that will distribute the sale proceeds. 26
In the present dataset, there were thirty-three turnaround firms retained
across thirty chapter 11 cases. That is, three debtors each retained two
turnaround firms, while twenty-seven debtors each retained a single turnaround
firm. Thirty-three fee applications are often an insufficient number to analyze
separately, but given the somewhat unique role these professionals play in
chapter 11 cases, it warrants accounting for their presence when considering
the topic of financial advisors, broadly defined.

22 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1234 (2006) (noting that Alvarez & Marsal serves as both an advisor to
creditors and as a turnaround consultant).
23 Id. at 1233.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Such a turnaround firm is working on the remainders of Lehman Brothers. See Nelson D. Schwartz &
Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/02/business/02workout.html.
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II. PREVALENCE & COST OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS
As shown in Figure 1, almost 70% of the debtors in the dataset, or sixtyseven of ninety-seven debtors, retain at least one financial advisor or
turnaround consultant; an almost equal number retain more than one. Eleven
debtors retained a turnaround consultant but no financial advisor. In the
dataset, seventy-four of the ninety-seven cases have at least one committee. In
fifty-seven of these cases, the committees retained at least one financial
advisor.
Table 2 shows the relationship between retention of financial advisors by
the debtor and its committees. Note that zero committee retentions in this
Table can either mean there was no committee, which happened in twenty-two
cases, or the committee retained no financial advisors, which happened in
eighteen cases; combining the two yields the forty total cases seen in the Table.
Other than bankruptcies with no financial advisors or turnaround consultants
involved in the case whatsoever, the next most likely outcome is for the debtor
and committee to each retain one financial advisor or turnaround consultant,
followed closely by one committee retention and two debtor retentions.
Table 2: Number of Financial Advisors & Turnaround
Consultants
Retained by committees in case
Retained by debtor in case

0

1

2

Total

0

24

6

0

30

1

12

22

3

37

2

4

19

3

26

3
Total

0
40

2
49

2
8

4
97

In eleven cases there was more than one committee appointed. In all of
these cases the committees retained at least one financial advisor; in six cases
they retained two, most often with each committee retaining its own financial
advisor. Multiple retentions of financial advisors by debtors do not seem to
turn on the number of committees. For example, there are twenty-six cases
with no committees appointed, yet in which the debtor retained two or more
financial advisors.
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If we limit our focus to the first committee appointed in the case—typically
the basic unsecured creditors’ committee—that committee retained a single
financial advisor in fifty-one cases, whereas it retained two financial advisors
in four cases.
Financial advisors, including turnaround consultants, are less likely to be
retained by debtors in the smallest quartile of cases in the dataset. As shown in
Table 2A, it also appears that multiple retentions are less likely to occur with
respect to the smaller debtors.27
Table 2A: Combined Debtor and Committee Financial
Advisor and Turnaround Consultant Retentions, by Debtor
Size
Number retained in case
Debtor size by quartile
1
2
3 4 5 6 Total
(smallest) 1
8
3
1 0 0 0
12
2
7
7
4 1 1 1
21
3
3
7
9 3 0 0
22
4
4
4 10 1 2 0
21
Total
22 21 24 5 3 1
76
Cases with no retentions omitted

Table 3 shows the typical cost for financial advisors and turnaround
consultants. For the sixty-six cases with at least one financial advisor or
turnaround consultant, the extra cost associated with these professionals
averages $2.9 million, with a median cost of $1.6 million.28 The debtor spends
much more on these professionals than committees, with the average debtor
spending $2.5 million as compared with $862,000 for committees. In other
words, debtors spend an average of about three times more than committees do
on these professionals.29

27 Cases with no financial advisors are omitted from Table 2A to reduce the number of cells and increase
readability. Tables 2 and 2A will not match up exactly, since Table 2A includes cases without committees,
while Table 2 excludes cases without committees.
28 The number of retained professionals in the following tables is somewhat less than the total number of
retentions discussed earlier, because fee applications are missing from some case dockets. That is, I know a
financial advisor or turnaround consultant was retained in some cases, but I do not know how much they were
paid.
29 Debtors spend 2.6 times more than committees on a median basis.
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Table 3: Cost of Financial Advisors and Turnaround Consultants

Debtor FA
Debtor TC
Debtor
Total
Committee
FA
All
combined

Obs
51

Mean
$1,966,577

Std. Dev.
$2,296,789

Median
$1,406,436

Min
$3,232

Max
$10,400,000

23

$2,113,132

$3,232,314

$1,010,300

$152,948

$15,800,000

59

$2,523,684

$3,767,882

$1,512,281

$3,875

$24,500,000

53

$862,493

$868,317

$554,448

$4,025

$3,028,514

66

$2,948,628

$4,206,185

$1,615,799

$3,875

$26,900,000

As shown in the top graph of Figure 4, in cases with both financial advisors
and turnaround consultants, these professionals constitute the largest cost after
debtor’s counsel, although the very small number of such cases suggests the
need for caution. One cannot be entirely sure a sample size of twenty-seven is
representative. As also shown in the same graph, these professionals combined
with bankruptcy counsel for the debtor and committee to make up more than
71% of the case’s overall cost. Turnaround consultants account for 17.27% of
total cost, while financial advisors account for 17.05% of total cost.
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The bottom graph of Figure 4 shows all cases with financial advisors,
regardless of whether there was a turnaround consultant. In this larger group,
financial advisors account for 18.2% of average cost, and together with the
attorneys and turnaround consultants, these three groups of professionals
represent almost 60% of the average total cost of chapter 11 cases. Financial
advisors, although receiving much attention and criticism, actually cost slightly
less, on average, than debtors’ bankruptcy attorneys.
The remaining 40% of professionals are comprised of a variety of lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals. Some, like appraisers and real estate
professionals, may be directly involved in the bankruptcy. Meanwhile, others
may be exogenous to the bankruptcy process, like lawyers handling a specific
piece of nonbankruptcy litigation or auditors that would have been retained
even if there had never been a bankruptcy case. In the latter case, the
professionals earn too much compensation to be retained under an “ordinary
course professionals” motion.30
III. MODELING THE COST OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS
In the only other attempt to model financial advisors’ costs in chapter 11,
LoPucki & Doherty (2008) found that debtor size, filing in Delaware or New
York, and the number of financial advisors retained in a case were the key
factors (p<0.05) in predicting total financial advisor cost.31 The authors also
found that retention of KPMG LLP as a financial consultant reduced overall
cost, although the implications of this finding are not discussed in their
article.32
I begin by testing the LoPucki & Doherty (2008) model on my data, using
the same factors save for KPMG retention. In LoPucki & Doherty (2008),
these factors were positively related to total financial advisor cost, although
30 Martin J. Bienenstock et al., Response to “Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee
Practices,” 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 549, 574 (2009) (“‘Ordinary course professionals’ are professionals paid less
than a fixed amount in a given month and with whom debtors frequently have prepetition, sometimes quite
long-standing relationships for services unrelated to the debtor’s Chapter 11 case.”). In larger cases, it has
become common to excuse nonbankruptcy “ordinary course” professionals from the formal retention and fee
approval system, although this practice is the subject of some controversy. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee Practices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 423, 430–43
(2009); see also Bienenstock et al., supra, at 574–76.
31 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 160–62 & tbl.10. The authors also found that their “trend”
variable was significant (p < 0.01). Id. at 160. The material presented in LoPucki & Doherty (2008) also
appears with some modifications and revisions in LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5.
32 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 162 tbl.10.
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time spent in chapter 11 was not significant.33 The authors reported that their
model resulted in an adjusted R-squared of 0.68.34
However, when applied to the present dataset, the LoPucki & Doherty
(2008) model achieves an adjusted R-squared (0.431). The two jurisdictional
variables are not significant.
In Table 5, I develop my own models. In the first model, I consider debtor
size. This should positively relate to cost, but consistent with my prior studies
on chapter 11 costs, I would expect debtor size to decrease in import as the
models begin to address complexity and other factors more directly.35
In the second model, I add a proxy for complexity—namely, a dummy
variable that indicates whether a claims agent was used in the case. This too
should positively correlate with cost.
In the third model, I add a dummy variable that indicates if both the debtor
and the committees had at least one financial advisor. This reflects the insight
from Table 5.1, which shows that there is often a kind of parallelism between
debtor and committee retention of financial advisors. Thus, this variable
indicates whether this kind of joint retention is present.
Table 5.1: Number of Financial Advisors Retained
Committees
Debtor
None
1 or more
Total

None
26
14
40

1 or more
15
42
57

Total
41
56
97

In the final model, I add the number of fee objections in the case to this
model, log transformed and mean centered—that is, the mean is subtracted
from every value.36 I use this variable as an index of how contentious the case
is, theorizing that these cases might be more likely to result in valuation
disputes and other litigation over the financial advisors’ work. The large lump
sum fees that financial advisors and turnaround consultants receive might
33

Id. at 160–62 & tbl.10.
Id. at 162 tbl.10.
35 See Stephen J. Lubben, What We ‘Know’ About Chapter 11 Cost is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. (forthcoming 2011); Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 7, at 106, 110.
36 Log of a zero value is undefined. To account for the number of cases with zero objections, I also add a
constant (0.001) to the total number of objections in all cases.
34
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make them the likely targets of a case with more fee objections.37 And
financial advisors typically pass on the cost of defending their retention and
compensation in bankruptcy court, which means that a more contentious case
will result in another layer of attorneys’ fees paid through the financial
advisor’s fee applications.38 By mean-centering the variable, the coefficient
can now be interpreted as indicating the extra cost associated with aboveaverage “contentiousness.” Cases with less-than-average contentiousness will
have a negative value in this variable, which, combined with the positive
coefficient shown in Table 5, results in lower overall financial advisor costs.
Throughout this Article, I adjust the standard errors to account for
potential, unseen correlations among cases within the same judicial district
(i.e., clustered standard errors).
The final model explains 64.4% of the variance in total financial advisor
and turnaround consultant costs, comparable to the models described in
LoPucki & Doherty (2008).39 The joint retention of financial advisors, case
complexity, and the contentiousness of the case are all significant factors in the
cost, after accounting for size and complexity.
The first two models, which involve size and complexity, explain very
little, suggesting that most of the work is done by the variables added in the
last two models.
IV. DEBTORS’ FINANCIAL ADVISORS & TURNAROUND CONSULTANTS
As noted, the bulk of the cost associated with financial advisors comes
from the debtor’s side of the case. Similarly, turnaround consultants are a
debtor-only phenomenon. Accordingly, I use this section to explore an
extension of the model developed in Table 5 to the specific issue of debtor
financial advisors and turnaround consultants.

37
38
39

See In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 127 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614, 2011 WL 3678171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
See supra text accompanying note 31.
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Table 5: Models of Total Financial Advisor Cost

Log of debtor
size
Claims agent
Both retained
FA
Log case objs,
centered

(1)
Log of
total
TC &
FA cost
in case

(2)
Log of
total TC
& FA
cost in
case

(3)
Log of
total TC
& FA cost
in case

(4)
Log of
total TC
& FA cost
in case

0.501*
(0.185)

0.317
(0.173)

0.234
(0.136)

0.236
(0.124)

0.776**
(0.258)

0.566**
(0.197)

0.478**
(0.173)

0.844***
(0.197)

0.789***
(0.172)
0.142***
(0.0381)

Constant

1.855
2.895*
3.181**
3.179**
(1.521)
(1.321)
(1.004)
(0.930)
Observations
66
66
66
66
R2
0.246
0.390*
0.567***
0.644***
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE adjusted for clustering by
district; mean VIF (model 4) 1.21
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 6: Number of Debtor Financial Advisors and
Turnaround Consultants
Financial Advisors
Turnaround Consultants
0
1
2
3
0
29
25
12
1
1
10
15
2
0
2
2
1
0
0
Total
41
41
14
1

Total
67
27
3
97
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Table 6 shows that although turnaround consultants and financial advisors
are often retained by the same debtor, the two are largely independent. In
twelve cases there were turnaround consultants without financial advisors; in
thirty-eight cases there were financial advisors without turnaround consultants;
in thirteen cases there were multiple financial advisors without any turnaround
consultants. And in twenty-nine cases the debtor retained neither.
I model debtor financial advisor cost (Model 1) and the combined cost of
debtor financial advisors and turnaround consultants (Model 2) in Table 7. In
both cases I use a modified version of the final model from Table 5, accounting
for the change in dependent variables, which no longer includes committee
financial advisors.
In particular, I enter measures of size, a proxy for complexity, and the
measure of case contentiousness, the mean-centered number of fee objections
in the case. I also use the dummy variable that indicates the retention of one or
more turnaround consultants. In addition, in these models I use a variable that
indicates if a committee was appointed in the case and another that counts the
number of debtor financial advisors. I hypothesize that all variables should be
positively related to cost in either model.
The first model considers the cost of debtor financial advisors alone. Size,
case contentiousness (number of fee objections), and appointment of a
committee are the key factors in this model. Interestingly, the number of debtor
financial advisors is not significant, which suggests that it does not matter if
the work is divided among multiple financial advisors. The appointment of a
turnaround consultant is also not significant, suggesting that the cost of
financial advisors is somewhat independent from the appointment of these
related professionals.
The second model follows the LoPucki & Doherty (2008) approach and
considers the two types of debtor professionals in the aggregate, using a single
model. The turnaround advisor variable is now significant, which is to be
expected as the difference in the two dependent variables is the turnaround
consultant cost.
Interestingly, in both models size is significant again. This may suggest a
debtor-specific effect that was hidden when considering the joint cost of
financial advisors in Table 5. For example, there may be an unmodeled
element of complexity here—larger debtors may engage their financial
advisors in different ways than smaller debtors.
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Table 7: Models of Debtor Financial Advisor & Turnaround Consultant Cost

Log of debtor size
Claims agent
Number of debtor FAs
Turnaround consultant
Log of objs, mean
centered
Committee
Constant
Observations
R2

(1)
Log of Debtor
FA cost

(2)
Log of Debtor TC &
FA cost

0.435**
(0.142)
0.119
(0.217)
-0.102
(0.176)
0.0654
(0.250)
0.143***

0.363***
(0.0737)
0.169
(0.150)
-0.0252
(0.131)
0.327*
(0.157)
0.134***

(0.0353)
0.834*
(0.327)
1.540
(0.925)
49
0.691

(0.0352)
0.670*
(0.281)
2.139**
(0.599)
57
0.681

Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE adjusted for clustering by district;
mean VIF 1.48 and 1.27, respectively.
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

V. FINANCIAL ADVISORS & TURNAROUND CONSULTANTS IN CHAPTER 11
The foregoing analysis highlights the importance of financial advisors and
turnaround consultants in modern chapter 11 practice. A sample of cases filed
in 2011 would undoubtedly show even more prevalence of these types of
professionals.40 Nonetheless, these sorts of professionals were largely
unknown when the Bankruptcy Code’s professional retention and
compensation provisions were drafted in the late 1970s.41
40 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 162–63 & tbl.11 (showing number of financial advisors
increases with the assets of the debtor and the number of days spent in bankruptcy).
41 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327–328, 330–331 (2006) (making no mention of financial advisors in the Code’s
retention and compensation provisions). Remember, of course, that the Code as enacted in 1978 continued the
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Thus, while § 328 allows some degree of flexibility with regard to the
terms of retention, many still envision all bankruptcy professionals billing by
the hour and keeping the corresponding time records.42 Financial advisors
work with a different model that involves higher risk and correspondingly
higher reward.43 They do not fit neatly into the existing Bankruptcy Code
scheme.
Perhaps nowhere is this friction better illustrated than in the confusion
surrounding § 328(a).44 Many courts read this provision as limiting their ability
to review compensation under § 330 at the end of a case.45 For a financial
advisor who may be compensated, at least in part, by a large success fee at the
end of the case, the temptation to reconsider that success fee with the benefit of
hindsight, and the knowledge of precisely how much it will be, may
overwhelm the commitment to the fee that occurred at the start of the case.46
Accordingly, courts have developed a number of elaborate rules regarding
the invocation of § 328(a).47 None of these rules finds much support in the

New Deal suspicion of most large investment bankers, a prohibition largely removed by the 2005
Amendments to the Code. See id. § 101(14) (lacking prior restrictions on participation of investment bankers
as “disinterested person[s]”); see also id. § 101(14)(B)–(E) (2000) (amended 2005) (containing significant
restrictions on involvement of investment bankers as disinterested persons); Miquelon-Weismann, supra note
18, at 736–47, 755–56 (2006) (discussing the history of the “categorical disqualification” of prepetition
investment bankers as “disinterested persons” prior to 2005).
42 For example, in their recent book, LoPucki and Doherty frequently complain that some courts do not
require such record keeping. LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5, at xxiii.
43 See In re Bigler, LP, 422 B.R. 638, 641–42 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
44 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (“The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the
court’s approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103
of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a
retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding
such terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation provided under
such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have
been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such
terms and conditions.”).
45 See Diana G. Adams & Roberta A. DeAngelis, Does “Improvident” Mean “Immutable”?: The
Standard of Review for Advisors’ Professional Fees, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2009, at 18, 78–79
(“Investment bankers have historically sought employment under terms and conditions that fixed their
compensation, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).”).
46 See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 128–29 & n.35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
47 For example, several courts have required varying degrees of “flag waiving” when a professional seeks
to invoke the terms of § 328(a). See, e.g., Nischwitz v. Miskovic (In re Airspect Air, Inc.), 385 F.3d 915, 921–
22 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring pre-approval of retention under § 328(a)); Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey,
Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002)
(“[U]nless a professional’s retention application unambiguously specifies that it seeks approval under § 328, it
is subject to review under § 330.”); Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir.
1995) (“‘If the order does not expressly and unambiguously state specific terms and conditions (e.g., specific
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actual text of the Code. On the other hand, professionals sometimes speak of
retention “under” § 328(a), as if this were a separate provision of the Code that
would allow professionals to bypass the general scheme set forth in §§ 327 and
330.48 But surely this is an impossibility, given § 328(a)’s express reference to
§ 327.49 In short, the caselaw analysis of the interrelationship between
§§ 327(a), 328(a), and 330 is nothing short of an intellectual mess.
Section 328(a) should be involved in every retention application, inasmuch
as retention involves not only checking for the kind of conflicts prohibited by
§ 327(a), but also considering whether the terms of the engagement are
reasonable. It is this latter factor that invokes § 328(a), whether the parties or
the court expressly mention it in the retention order.
In the case of attorneys, it is easy to understand the distinction between preretention analysis under § 328(a) and post-retention analysis under § 330.50 In
short, § 328 involves whether the proposed hourly rate is reasonable,51 while
§ 330 involves consideration of whether the number of hours actually billed
was reasonable.52 The court approves the rate at the point of retention and the

hourly rates or contingency fee arrangements) that are being approved pursuant to the first sentence of
[§] 328(a), then the terms and conditions are merely those that apply in the absence of specific agreement. That
leaves the court free to apply lodestar rates unfettered by the strictures of the second sentence of [§] 328(a).’”
(quoting In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 685 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988))).
48 Courts also add to the confusion. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. (In re
Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997) (suggesting § 328 as a way to avoid § 330); Nischwitz
v. Airspect Air, Inc. (In re Airspect Air, Inc.), 288 B.R. 464, 470 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2003) (“The widely accepted
general rule is that bankruptcy courts, once having approved the employment under § 328, may not later
switch to § 330 to award fees.”), rev’d on other grounds, 385 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Westbrooks, 202
B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (“If the bankruptcy court pre-approves the terms of the appointment, it
does not have the power to make a ‘reasonableness’ review.”).
49 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (“The trustee, . . . with the court’s approval, may employ or authorize the
employment of a professional person under [§] 327 or 1103 of this title . . . .”).
50 See Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Smart
World Techs., LLC), 552 F.3d 228, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2009) (drawing such a distinction).
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).
52 Section 330, which governs compensation of officers such as professionals, provides in pertinent part:
(3) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee
under chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the
value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including—
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at
which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate
with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;
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total number of hours at the point of the fee application.53 The only instance in
which this division breaks down is when the rates previously approved must be
reconsidered because they prove to be “improvident in light of developments
not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such [rates].”54
However, this scheme does not work very well when applied to a lump sum
bonus paid at the end of a case. The bonus is an abstraction at the start of the
case, a percentage of an unknown number that will be paid at some unknown
point the future, and at the end of the case there is no way to reasonably
untangle the two types of reasonableness review.55 Reviewing the bonus for its
reasonableness under § 330 inevitably impinges on issues that should have
been settled under the structure set up by §§ 327 and 328.56
Given the data presented in this paper, it seems that it is time to resolve
these important questions through a general reconsideration of the Code’s
provisions regarding professional retention.
CONCLUSION
Studies of chapter 11 fees in the aggregate, and the chapter 11 fees of
attorneys in particular, are common.57 This Article examines the other big
source of professional costs in chapter 11: financial advisors and the subsidiary
group of professionals known as turnaround consultants. Almost 70% of the
debtors, or sixty-seven of ninety-seven debtors, in the dataset retain at least one
financial advisor or turnaround consultant, and an almost equal number retain
more than one. Many committees also retained financial advisors.
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise
has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged
by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
Id. § 330(3).
53 See id. §§ 328(a), 330(a)(3).
54 Id. § 328(a).
55 See In re XO Commc’n, Inc. 323 B.R. 330, 339 n.11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting the court had
approved the financial advisors’ monthly fees under § 328(a), but not the “success fee,” leaving the court free
to consider the latter under § 330).
56 And thus leading to the confusion seen in cases like Committee of Equity Security Holders of FederalMogul Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Federal Mogul-Global, Inc.), 348 F.3d 390
(3d Cir. 2003), in which § 328(a) was held to constrain the ex post analysis under § 330. Comm. of Equity Sec.
Holders of Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Fed. Mogul-Global, Inc.), 348
F.3d 390, 396–403 (3d Cir. 2003).
57 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263,
272–76 (2010) (reviewing the studies).
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For the sixty-six cases with at least one financial advisor or turnaround
consultant, the extra cost associated with these averages $2.9 million, with a
median cost of $1.6 million. The debtor spends much more on these
professionals than committees, with the average debtor spending $2.5 million
as compared to $862,000 for committees. In other words, debtors are spending
an average of about three times as much as committees on these professionals.
Perhaps most importantly, this Article shows that the joint retention of
financial advisors by the debtor and the committee results in increased cost.
The Bankruptcy Code as currently written has but limited capacity to adapt
to these new developments. It is time for an update.

